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Many of the studies on the Islamic market doctrine have failed to integrate the 
idea within the broad social objective of its Islamic doctrinal origin. Consequently, 
the outcomes of such studies have only partially explicated the Islamic market 
theory. This brief study attempts to contextualize the Islamic market ideology 
within the broad social goal of the Islamic Shari’ah (law), in order to give it a 
more complete understanding. Using an interpretative approach that attempts to 
integrate market moral injunctions, pricing and profit, and price control, among 
others into the broader social doctrine of Islam, we established that the Islamic 
market ideology, broadly, seeks to promote the overall economic well-being of 
the members of society through creating fair opportunities for economic gains, 
enforcing the right to private property, and curbing exploitative tendencies of 
economic agents towards one another, among other things. Consequently, the 
Islamic market ideology is founded on the ideals of economic justice, which, 
generally, emphasize fairness as a moral duty enforceable by the state. It is further 
established that the individual has the right to engage in exchange activities and 
earn fair rewards, and this must not, ordinarily, be interfered with. However, 
when, in the course of exercising this right, the individual’s pursuit of self-interest 
puts the overall public welfare into jeopardy, the state is obliged to give public 
welfare precedence over individual self-interests. Thus, there is room for the state 
to intervene even in pricing; though, under normal circumstances, prices in the 
market should depend on the prevailing market conditions.
Keywords: Islam, market, economic justice, pricing, profit, public welfare.
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Intoduction.
The market doctrine of Islam (or aspects of it) has (have) received considerable attention in literature. The earlier scholars have usually approached it from a legalistic perspective, 
mostly content with distinguishing between the permissible and 
impermissible market behaviors. The more recent studies, on the 
other hand, have tried to derive an ideology similar to modern 
ideologies on the subject (such as capitalism and socialism). 
For instance, recent studies on the history of Islamic economic 
thought (such as, Essid;1 Abdul Azim Islahi;2 Ghazanfar and Islahi;3 
Hosseini;4 Ghazanfar and Islahi;5 Hosseini;6 and Islahi7) have often 
attempted to derive a coherent idea of an ‘Islamic free market’ in their 
discussions, based on the literature of the early scholars. However, 
some of these studies have often treated the subject briefly, limiting 
their discussions to aspects of it. Oguz and Tabakoglu,8 for instance, 
briefly discuss market pricing in Islam as a background to analyzing 
state pricing behavior in the Ottoman State; another example is 
Puthenpeedikayil who presents the subject simply as “either in the 
form of certain market norms or in the form of some prohibitions.”9 Other 
studies are simply attempts to coherently summarize expositions 
1  M. Yassine Essid, “Islamic Economic Thought,” in Pre-Classical Economic 
Thought, ed. by S. Todd Lowry, (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1987), pp. 77–102. 
2  Abdul Azim Islahi, Economic Concepts of Ibn Taimiyah, (United Kingdom: Kube 
Publishing Limited, 1988).
3  Also published as Abdul Azim Islahi, “Explorations in Medieval Arab-
Islamic Economic Thought: Some Aspects of Ibn Taimiyyah’s Economics.” In Shaikh 
Mohammad Ghazanfar (ed.), Medieval Islamic Economic Thought: Filling the Great Gap in 
European Economics, (Francis: Taylor & Francis, 2003), pp. 53-71.
4  Also published as Hosseini Hamid, “Understanding the Market Merchanism 
Before Adam Smith: Economic Thought in Medieval Islam.” Vol. 27, issue 3, 1995. In 
Shaikh Mohammad Ghazanfar (Ed.), Medieval Islamic Economic Though:t…, pp. 88-107.
5  Also published as Abdul Azim Islahi, “Explorations in Medieval Arab-Islamic 
Economic Thought: Some Aspects of Ibn Al-Qayyim’s Economics (691-751 AH/ 1292-
1350 AD).” In Shaikh Mohammad Ghazanfar (Ed.), Medieval Islamic Economic Thought:…, 
pp. 128-141.
6  Hamid S. Hosseini, “Contribution of Medieval Muslim Scholars to the History 
of Economics and Their Impact: A Refutation of The Schumpeterian Great Gap,” In 
Warren J. Samuels, Jeff E. Biddle, and John B. Davis (eds.), A Companion to the History of 
Economic Thought, (United Kongdom: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp. 28-45.
7  Abdul Azim Islahi, Contribution of Muslim Scholars to Economic Thought and 
Analysis, (Jeddah: King Abdul Aziz University Press, 2005), pp. 25-33.
8  Orhan Oguz and Ahmed Tabakoglu, “An Historical Approach to Islamic 
Pricing Policy: A Research on the Ottoman Price System and Its Application,” J.KAU: 
Islamic Economics, Vol. 3 (1991), pp. 63–79.
9  Sajid Puthenpeedikayil, “Notions of Free Market and Social Welfare in Islamic 
Economics,” Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing, Vol. 11, No. 9 (2015), p. 479.
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of early scholars on the subject. Abdul Azim Islahi, Ghazanfar and 
Islahi, for instance, discuss the economic ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah, 
and, in these, explain his understanding of the Islamic market 
ideology; Ghazanfar and Islahi, also discuss the ideas of Ibn al-
Qayyim (d. 1350) in a similar style.
Undoubtedly, Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) has made significant 
contributions to the subject matter (i.e., Islamic market), especially 
with his work, Al-Hisbah fi-l-Islam (translated as: Public Duties in 
Islam), dedicated to, among other things, juristic discussions on many 
aspects of the subject – including market pricing, price regulation, 
etc. It is the basis upon which a lot of recent studies on price 
control in Islam have been conducted, a testament to its valuable 
contribution. An example of such recent studies is the third chapter 
of Abdul Azim Islahi’s Economic Concepts of Ibn Taymiyyah, which 
attempts to synchronize Ibn Taymiyyah’s ideas, from his various 
writings,10 into some coherence. On its own, this study is a valuable 
addition to the literature. Other examples include Muhammad L. 
Bashar’s Price Control in an Islamic Economy11 and Muhammad H. 
Kamali’s Tasʽīr (Price Control) in Islamic Law,12 both of which give 
detailed discussions of scholarly positions on the fixation of price 
by public authority, using Ibn Taymiyyah’s book as their main 
reference material. However, as far as the subject matter of Islamic 
market doctrine is concerned, price control is just an aspect; Islam’s 
market ideology is wider and more comprehensive than issues of 
price control (tas’īr), though such issues form an integral part of 
the ideology. Some attempt must be made to widen the discussion, 
by putting together all relevant aspects of the subject matter into 
some coherent whole, in order to convey a much more complete 
understanding. A study based on such an approach would be 
important to the attempt to understand the economics of historical 
Islamdom, as well as future attempts [if any] to apply such a doctrine 
in organizing society.  
In view of the above, this study seeks to undertake an integrated 
analysis of the Islamic market doctrine. In the forthcoming sections, 
we will attempt to explicate the Islamic market ideology as one 
that functions toward the fulfilment of economic good, an integral 
10  Including collections of religious verdicts (fatāwa) issued by him.
11  Muhammad Lawal Ahmad Bashar, ‘Price Control in an Islamic Economy,’ 
J.KAU: Islamic Economics, Vol. 9 (1997), pp. 29–52.
12  Mohamad Hashim Kamali, “Tas’ir (Price Control) in Islamic Law”, American 
Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 11, No. 1, (Association of Muslim Social Scientists, 
1994), pp. 25–37.
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component of the public good that Islamic law functions to fulfil. 
Economic good, from the Islamic perspective, entails fair and 
equitable provision of the means of sustenance to all members of 
society, and an equitable distribution of wealth, among other things. 
We will attempt to present the market as an institution that functions 
to achieve these ends, a function that necessitates its structuring on 
the ideals of justice. Thus, in a nutshell, our study seeks to explain 
Islamic market as an ideology that is structured on the ideals of 
justice to ensure the attainment of society’s economic good. We 
will establish that though the interest of individuals is upheld, 
public welfare is given precedence when the two [i.e., individual 
interest and public welfare] are in conflict. Our approach, we hope, 
will convey a more complete understanding of the Islamic market 
doctrine, and put the legal norms and prohibitions, with respect to 
market activities, into proper perspective.
The approach to this study draws inspiration from the Qur’anic 
conception of human life on earth – a struggle towards the attainment 
of ranks in servitude of the Creator.13 This conception implies that 
life is “an integrated whole with integrally functional components, each 
of which functions towards the fulfilment of service to God.”14 Scriptural 
guidance reflects this idea,15 and thus lays down the moral code in 
line with it. On the basis of this, it is possible to postulate that Islam’s 
social ideology, in its entirety, seeks to enhance the individual’s 
quest towards spiritual success by organizing his/ her relations and 
social setting in a manner harmonious with the ultimate goal.16 Each 
aspect of the social doctrine has an integral role to play towards 
the fulfilment of this overall goal. For any Islamic intellectual social 
discourse to remain true to its character and purpose, it must be 
conducted within the boundaries of this conception and in harmony 
with it. The renowned scholars of the early generation(s) understood 
this idea and, thus, conducted their intellectual endeavors on 
a methodology in tune with it. Scholars such as Abu Yusuf (731-
798), Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780-855), Abu Muhammad Ibn Hazm 
13  Adada Mohammed Abdul-Rahim, “Economics In An Islamic Society: A 
Theoretical Exposition”, Adam Academy Journal of Social Science, Vol. 8, No. 2, (Ankara 
Center for Thought and Research-ADAM, 2018), pp. 301–23. Also see Qur’an 51: 56.
14  Ibid., p. 305.
15  “O you who have believed, enter into Islam completely [and perfectly] and do not 
follow the footsteps of Satan. Indeed, he is to you a clear enemy” [Qur’an 2: 208 (Saheeh 
International Translation, 2010)]
16  Scholars of Maqāsid Ash-Sharī’ah (Objectives of Islamic Law) attest to this 
postulation. See Jasser Auda, Maqasid Al-Shariah as philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems 
Approach, (London: International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), 2007).
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(994-1064), Abu Hamīd Al-Ghazālī (1058-1111), Ibn Taymiyyah 
(1263-1328), Ibn Al-Qayyim (1292-1350) rendered their intellectual 
works based on the “holistic” intellectual methodology,17 which 
presumed that “all behavior… is teleological, in that its ultimate 
aim is God and salvation.”18 In their scholarly endeavors, the 
prominent Islamic scholars of the pre-modern times did not simply 
decorate secular discussions with scriptural texts, as contemporary 
Muslim thinkers and researcher are wont to do; they contextualized 
social discussions as integrative components of an Islamic social 
ideology. Every idea or concept that relates to human life is, thus, 
expressed as a component of an ethos (i.e. the Islamic value system) 
that guides and organizes human life towards the fulfillment of the 
ultimate (spiritual) end. In applying this interpretative approach 
to this study, we would be establishing a context for the broad 
understanding of the Islamic market philosophy and the specific 
issues that constitute its character, such as the moral injunctions, 
pricing and profit-making, state intervention, etc. This should create 
a more integrated picture of the idea than has been presented in the 
current literature. To establish the market doctrine as integral to the 
attainment of the broad social object of the Shari’ah, we link all the 
specific aspects of the subject to the ideals of social justice from the 
Islamic perspective.
Before we proceed, two clarifications are necessary. First, with 
respect to commodities subject to the normative laws of the market, 
Islamic scholars distinguish between necessities and luxuries, and 
this distinction has a bearing on legalities of action in relation to 
commodities. For instance, Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) contends that 
“people have no compelling need” for luxuries (relative to necessities) 
and that they demand them simply for “the diversification of 
desires.”19 Consequently, people “spend their money voluntarily and 
willingly [on luxuries], and they retain no hankering after (the money) 
they have paid.”20  Thus, there is no blame on a seller/merchant if 
he hoards luxury goods in order to make higher economic gains. 
In this study, the discussion is limited to commodities that are 
considered necessities; these obviously vary according to location 
17  Shaikh Mohammad Ghazanfar, Abdul Azim Islahi, “Economic Thought of 
an Arab Scholastic Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (AH 450-505/1058-1111 AD).” In Ghazanfar 
(ed.), Medieval Islamic Economic Thought:…, p. 23.
18  Ibid., p. 12.
19  ‘Abdurrahman ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction 
to History, Vol. II, (Franz Rosenthal, trans., (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), p. 339.
20  Ibid.
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and time, but the general rule applies to them as long as they are 
considered necessities. Secondly, the Islamic market doctrine, as a 
normative ideal, applies to an Islamic context, where a legitimate 
Islamic political authority is recognized as such, though aspects of it 
are applicable, generally, in non-Islamic settings. Thus, our analysis 
assumes an Islamic setting, with a functioning Islamic government.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two, 
public interest is discussed as an object of Islamic law, from which 
derives economic good as an objective of the Islamic economic 
doctrine. The concept of justice is introduced as an integral element 
of the Law, and a means through which public good is realized; as a 
subset of justice, economic justice is presented as the concept upon 
which the Islamic market doctrine is founded, and as a necessary 
means to attaining economic good. Section two discusses the role of 
the market in society, from the Islamic perspective, as a precursor 
to an overview of the Islamic market ideology, which is discussed 
in section three. In section four, we analyse price formation in the 
Islamic market, to which issues of production and factor returns 
are relevant, and are, thus, duly discussed. Finally, we discuss price 
control (tas’īr) in Islamic law, in section five, and then present a 
historical summary of how the various legal positions on it have 
been applied in Islamdom. Then we present a conclusion to our 
discussion in section six.
Public Interest and Social Justice in Islamic Law.
It is a consensus among Islamic scholars that one of the 
central objects of Islamic Law (Shari’ah) is the advancement and 
preservation of public interest. Auda contends that the term maṣālih 
(public interests), for many Islamic legal scholars, is synonymous 
with maqāṣid al-Shari’ah (purposes of the Islamic Law), citing, as an 
example, Abd al-Malik al-Juwayni’s (d. 1085) usage of al-maqāṣid 
and al-masālih al-‘āmmah [public interest] as synonymous terms.21 
Al-Qarafī (d.1868) elaborates this relationship, asserting that “[a] 
purpose (maqṣid) is not valid unless it leads to the fulfilment of some 
good (maṣlahah) or the avoidance of some mischief (mafsadah).”22 
Thus, the Shari’ah seeks to promote all that is good (for society 
and its members) and to thwart all that is bad (for society and all 
individuals within it). So, what specifically does maṣlahah (public 
21  Jasser Auda, Maqasid Al-Shariah as philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach, 
(London: The International Institute of Islamic Thought-IIIT, 2007)
22  Ibid, p. 2
Vol. 5, No. 1 Juni 2019     7
Abdul Rahim Mohammed Adada
“good”) imply with respect to the application of the Shari’ah? Fazl-
u-Rahman Ansari answers this question, profoundly, with his 
assertion that the Shari’ah enjoins the political authority of an Islamic 
society (i.e., the state) to pursue “the spiritual, moral, intellectual, 
physical and social preservation and development of the individuals, with 
a view to the establishment of a righteous society, i.e. a society which is 
healthy in all respects.”23 Clearly, the object of the Shari’ah is linked 
with the Islamic concept of human life, and public ‘good/ interest/ 
welfare’ implies a broad terminology that entails all the facets of 
a complete life; Imam al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) opines that “Islam sets 
goals24 for human life” and that “[all] matters (be they activities or 
things) that help in achieving these goals increase social welfare, 
and are called maṣālih…; those opposite are mafāsid [i.e., things that 
cause losses in public welfare].”25 The spirit of the law, thus, is to 
help the individual achieve success in life by promoting a positive 
development of his/ her personality and creating a society that 
supports this agenda. In order to achieve this all-important goal 
of promoting public good, there are very important principles that 
must be adhered to, and which have been made an integral part of 
the law. One of such principles is the duty of establishing justice in 
society. This Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350) alludes to with his 
assertion that the “Sharī’ah is God’s justice and mercy amongst His 
people” and that “[life], nutrition, medicine, light, recuperation and 
virtue are made possible by it.”26
Justice, divinely ordained27 upon human beings and the 
political state, may be defined as “giving to everyone his due on the 
basis of equity.”28 The Qur’an portrays it “as an imperative which is 
23  Muhammad Fazl-u-Rahman Ansari, The Qur’anic Foundations and Structure of 
Muslim Society Vol. II, (Karachi: Elite Publishers, 2008), Fourth ed., p. 57.
24  The ultimate goal is the attainment of eternal bliss [see Al-Ghazālī, Ihya Ulum-
Id-Din (Revival of Religious Learnings) Vol. II, Fazl-ul-Karim, trans., (Karachi: Darul-
Ishaat, 1993), p.45]
25  Shaikh Mohammad Ghazanfar, Abdul Azim Islahi, Economic Thought of Al-
Ghazali (450-505 A.H./ 1058-1111 A.D.). Islamic Economics Research Series, (Jeddah: King 
Abdulaziz University Press, 1997), p. 7.
26  Nurdeng Deuraseh, “New Essential Values of Daruriyyah (Necessities) of The 
Objectives of Islamic Law (Maqasid al-Shari’ah),” Jurnal Hadhari, Vol. 4, No. 2, (2012), 
pp. 107-116. 
27  Part of the mission of the prophets sent by God to various nations was to 
establish justice among the people: “We have already sent Our messengers with clear 
evidences and sent down with them the Scripture and the balance that the people may maintain 
[their affairs] in justice” [Qur’an 57:25 (Saheeh International Translation, 2010)].
28  Muhammad Fazl-u-Rahman Ansari, The Qur’anic Foundations and Structure of 
Muslim Society Vol. I, (Karachi: Elite Publishers, 2008), Fourth ed., p. 209.
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unconditionally, universally and absolutely binding…on everyone, 
under all circumstances, and in all situations.”29 It is “an absolutely 
indispensable ingredient of the maqāṣid al-Sharī’ah, so far so that it 
is impossible to conceive of an ideal Muslim society where justice has 
not been established.”30 Establishing justice is not just a duty but a 
virtue of a very high regard; it is “nearest to piety” according to 
the Qur’an.31 In its broad sense, it is classified into two categories: 
justice at the individual level; and justice at the collective level.32 
At the individual level, justice implies the active pursuit of self-
development in harmony with the ethics of the Qur’an, and the 
observance of fairness in dealings with other members of society 
(i.e. giving to others their due in the most deserving manner).33 At 
the collective (communal) level, justice relates to four aspects of the 
social organization, including justness with respect to: (1) social 
relations; (2) the process and enforcement of the Law; (3) economic 
administration; and (4) political administration;34 all these have 
their respective roles to play in bringing about public good. In line 
with the theme of this study, we focus on two aspects of justice; 
individual justice, and the administration of economic justice at the 
communal level. We discuss them not as separate themes, but as 
aspects of the overall concept of economic justice, which, in turn, is 
an integral component of the broad conception of justice from the 
Islamic viewpoint.
The administration of economic justice (at the individual and 
communal levels) is important to the Islamic market doctrine; the 
ideals of the Islamic market doctrine are built on the principles of 
justice within the above-mentioned forms. The establishment of the 
ideals of economic justice is as indispensable to the achievement of 
economic good as the establishment of justice, in its broad sense, is 
to the achievement of public good. Thus, the Islamic market doctrine 
cannot be properly understood without first understanding the 
ideals of justice at the communal and individual economic levels. 
First and foremost, it is important to highlight some key Qur’anic 
29  Muhammad Fazl-u-Rahman Ansari, The Qur’anic Foundations and Structure of 
Muslim Society.., pp. 208-9.
30  Muhammad Umer Chapra, Islam And The Economic Challenge, 6th ed., 
(Leicester, UK: Islamic Foundation, 1992), p. 209.
31  “…Be just; that is nearer to righteousness” [Qur’an 5:8 (Saheeh International 
Translation, 2010)].
32  Muhammad Fazl-u-Rahman Ansari, The Qur’anic Foundations and Structure of 
Muslim Society Vol. I, (Karachi: Elite Publishers, 2008), Fourth ed.
33  Ibid.
34  Ibid.
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concepts upon which the principles of economic justice are built. 
The first important Qur’anic concept is that “all human beings are 
equally honorable in respect of their humanity.”35 The Qur’an states: 
“And We have certainly honored the children of Adam and carried them 
on the land and sea and provided for them of the good things and preferred 
them over much of what We have created, with [definite] preference.”36 
This principle enjoins all individuals to treat fellow human beings 
in the manner befitting their humanness, and in the manner they 
would wish other human beings to treat them. Secondly, the Qur’an 
guarantees every member of the society the right to sustenance.37 
This, according Fazlur Rahman Ansari, implies that “all human 
beings have equal right to the means of sustenance found on earth-and 
that, consequently, the citizens of the Islamic State have equal right to the 
means of sustenance found in the State.”38 The third Qur’anic concept 
is that the reward of labor must be commensurate with the effort 
applied: “And that there is not for man except that [good] for which he 
strives.”39 This implies that the state is duty-bound “to establish an 
economic order wherein the labor of every citizen is fully rewarded.”40 
Finally, it is also a Qur’anic concept that material wealth in society 
must not be concentrated in the hands of a few privileged members, 
thus creating wide income and material disparity among members 
of society.41
On the basis of these four concepts (among others), the state 
has a duty to create an economic order with the following features:
1. It should guarantee all members the right to private 
property and protection against its unlawful violation. 
Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradāwi says, in this regard, that “[since] 
the Sharī’ah sanctions the right to personal property, it protects 
it, both by means of moral exhortation and legislation, from 
robbery, theft, and fraud.”42
35  Muhammad Fazl-u-Rahman Ansari, The Qur’anic Foundations and Structure of 
Muslim Society, book III, Vol. II (Karachi: Elite Publishers, 2008), Fourth ed., p. 73.
36  Qur’an 17:70 (Saheeh International Translation, 2010)
37  “And He placed on the earth firmly set mountains over its surface, and He blessed 
it and determined therein its [creatures’] sustenance in four days without distinction - for [the 
information] of those who ask” [Qur’an 41:10 (Saheeh International Translation, 2010)]
38  Muhammad Fazl-u-Rahman Ansari, The Qur’anic Foundations and Structure of 
Muslim Society, book III, Vol. II…, p. 72.
39  Qur’an 53:39 (Saheeh International Translation, 2010)
40  Muhammad Fazl-u-Rahman Ansari, The Qur’anic Foundations and Structure of 
Muslim Society, book III, Vol. II…, p. 73
41  See Qur’an 59:7; it lays out this principle clearly.
42  Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam, K. Al-Hilbawi, et.al, 
trans., (Cairo: Al-Falah Foundation for Translation, 2001), 2nd ed., p. 326.
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2. It should provide equitable opportunity for all abled 
members of society to engage in economic activity and 
earn just rewards from it.
3. The system should ensure fair and balanced distribution of 
wealth in society by:
a. Creating a production and exchange arrangement 
that guarantees fair outcomes to all participants. 
b. Ensuring productive use of resources, without 
wastage, idleness, and extravagance.
c. Enforcing the welfare system through which the 
rich take care of the poor and needy. It is important 
to note that Islam frowns upon deliberate economic 
inactivity (and, consequently, permanent economic 
dependence upon others) and encourages its 
adherents to earn their livelihood with their own 
hands. It is forbidden for man “to depend on charity 
while he is able to earn what is sufficient for his and his 
family’s needs through his own efforts.”43 However, 
it also recognizes that some members of society, 
due to circumstances beyond their control, find 
themselves in a position of weakness, and thus 
have their right to sustenance upon the society.44
d. Enforcing the prohibition of usury and interest (of 
all forms) as a means of preventing the rich from 
milking the poor and widening the economic gap. 
4. It should enforce the prohibition of all forms of economic 
exploitation at all levels of society.45 And this is important 
to the preservation of equality in human value, the 
labor’s right to fair reward, and the right to fair economic 
opportunities for all persons.
5. The individual members of society must be morally 
trained/persuaded (and/or legally compelled) to:
43  Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam..., p. 121.
44  This is taken care of through the zakat system and other similar interventions. 
45  “The way (of blame) is only against those who oppress men and wrongly rebel in 
the earth, for such there will be a painful torment.” [Qur’an 42:42 (Saheeh International 
Translation, 2010)]
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a. Actively pursue economic activity in order to be self-
reliant;
b. Act within moral bounds in their economic dealings;
c. Desist from exploiting other persons for their personal 
economic benefits;
d. Desist from denying others the opportunity to seek 
their sustenance by either seeking to monopolize 
aspects of the production and exchange arrangement 
or using force;
e. Refrain from causing damage to, or wasting, resources 
that are owned individually or collectively;
f. Willingly contribute to the welfare scheme that seeks 
to take care of those in need.
The above-mentioned principles are by no means exhaustive 
in regards to the completeness of the Islamic concept of economic 
justice. However, they are enough to support the argument to be 
presented in forthcoming sections of this study. 
So, in light of the principles enumerated above, the Islamic 
economic order (or any aspect of it) would seek to establish a society 
that promotes the overall economic well-being of its members 
through creating fair opportunities for economic gains, enforcing 
the right to private property, curbing exploitative tendencies of 
economic agents towards one another, and other measures like 
these that are consistent with the value system of Islam. The market 
component of the Islamic economic doctrine plays the role of 
ensuring that the market institution accords all members of society a 
fair chance of fulfilling their needs in the most just manner, whether 
they are acquiring or they are providing. Most essentially, economic 
interests of individuals must not put the general need of the society 
into jeopardy; that is, the pursuit of the private profit motive must 
not result in undue denial of other people’s right to sustenance, 
impede others’ right to participation, or result in exploitative 
behaviors.
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The Role of The Market in Society.
Islam recognizes the market as an avenue for people to acquire 
what they need in exchange for what they possess according to 
mutual terms. It also recognizes it as a means through which 
people translate their productive labor into fair economic gains. In 
a nutshell, it is an avenue through which the economic needs of 
society are fulfilled. Without such an avenue, people would simply 
be stuck with their own possessions, unable to obtain the materials 
they require to have a balanced life. Its absence may even threaten 
order in society as this would impede production of, and access 
to, the necessities of life. Every necessity of life is only obtainable 
through an exchange avenue, and that is what the market represents. 
Imam al-Ghazalī emphasizes the role of the market in society with 
the following example: “…a man has got food, but has got no riding 
camel. He who has got a camel has got necessity of food. So between 
them there is the necessity of exchange of these two things and fixation of 
their value.”46 In the Qur’an, God asserts how integral the markets 
were even to the lives of previously sent prophets and messengers 
of God: “And We did not send before you [O Muhammad] any of the 
messengers except that they ate food and walked in the markets.”47 This 
citation highlights, among other things, the role of the market in 
providing an avenue for access to foodstuff, a necessity of life, and 
also how the prophets and messenger did not allow spirituality 
to prevent them from seeking livelihood through the markets. 
Indeed, among the first things Prophet Muhammad is reported to 
have done, upon migration to al-Madinah, was to designate a place 
for setting up a market,48 a proof of how important the Prophet 
considered the market to the order of society. The market is, thus, 
pivotal to the attainment of the economic good. It brings to a point 
the collective outcome of the society’s productive activities, and 
ensures their appropriate distribution. It also serves as means of 
actualizing the divinely-ordained right to own and earn, such that 
private individuals are able to attain rewards for their legitimate 
offer of labor.
46  Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad at-Tusi Al-Ghazali, Ihya Ulum-Id-
Din [Revival of Religious Learning], Vol. IV, Fazl-u-l-Karim, trans., (Karachi: Darul-Ishaat, 
1993), p. 83.
47  [Qur’an 25: 20 (Saheeh International Translation, 2010)].
48  Sayed Kazem Sadr, The Economic System of the Early Islamic Period: Institutions 
and Policies, (Tehran: Shaheed Beheshti University Publishing, 2016)
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As important as the market is, Islam also recognizes it as a 
meeting point of individuals who, by their innate nature, have an 
avaricious tendency (see Qur’an 100:8).49 Ibn Kathīr (d.1373), in his 
Qur’anic commentary, says the verse (i.e., Qur’an 100:8) implies 
either that man is “severe in his love of wealth” or that “he is covetous 
and stingy due to the love of wealth.”50 The Prophet is also reported 
to have said: “If Adam’s son [man] had a valley full of gold, he would 
like to have two valleys, for nothing fills his mouth except dust [of the 
grave].”51 If allowed to act freely in such avenues for exchange, the 
avariciousness of men would be nurtured into producing disastrous 
consequences for both men (in their persons) and society at large.52 
Love of wealth and the desire to acquire them in multitudes will 
become the dominant intent of men in their economic pursuits, 
and eventually destroy their spirituality. For society, there are two 
possible consequences of such freedom. First, the public would 
be at the mercy of greedy merchants/suppliers, who would apply 
all means necessary to increase their market shares and economic 
gains; consequently, public economic welfare suffers, even though a 
few private individuals make enormous gains. Such a phenomenon 
would be contrary to the Qur’anic principle that encourages a 
wider dispersion of wealth rather than its concentration in the 
hands of few privileged members of society.53 Second, the market, if 
absolutely free, reorganizes its distribution toward areas that attract 
the largest economic gains. Though economic theory predicts a 
normalization of profits in the long-term for such free markets, 
the intermittent short-term movements according to magnitude of 
gains is, obviously, detrimental to basic needs of the public; the self-
regulating market responds to its own needs rather than the needs 
of the larger public. 
49  “And indeed he [man] is, in love of wealth, intense” See in A.B. al-Mehri (ed.), 
The Qur’an: With Surah Introduction and Appendices: Saheeh International Translation (UK: 
Maktabah Booksellers and Publishers, 2010).
50  Imam Abu al-Fida Isma’il Ibn Kathir, Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr, Vol. X, J. Abualrub, et.al, 
trans., (Riyadh: Maktaba Dar-us-Salam, 2003), p. 568.
51  “If Adam’s son had a valley full of gold, he would like to have two valleys, for nothing 
fills his mouth except dust. And Allah forgives him who repents to Him.” [Sahih al-Bukhari, 
Vol. 8, Hadith No. 6439]
52  “Satan threatens you with poverty and orders you to immorality, while Allah 
promises you forgiveness from Him and bounty. And Allah is all-Encompassing and Knowing” 
[Qur’an 2: 268 (Saheeh International Translation, 2010)]
53  In [Qur’an 59: 8 (Saheeh International Translation, 2010)], God says: “And 
what Allah restored to His Messenger from the people of the towns – it is for Allah and for the 
Messenger and for [his] near relatives and orphans and the [stranded] traveler – so that it will 
not be a perpetual distribution among the rich from among you…” 
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In view of the above, Islam places moral obstructions on the 
freedom of the market to self-regulate; such obstructions are moral 
obligations upon market participants, fulfilment of which are 
integral to the Muslim personality. Those with the requisite moral 
training are, naturally, able to fulfil these; on the other hand, the 
state is obliged to impose their fulfilment upon men when they 
falter on their own. Market regulation, therefore, is an integral duty 
of the state, whose primary objective is to promote public good–a 
comprehensive concept that captures all aspects of society. Thus, 
the Islamic market provides a balance between the individual’s 
right/ freedom to produce, trade, and earn fair rewards, on the 
one hand, and society’s overall economic welfare, on the other. 
The individual’s exercise of his freedom is not allowed to produce 
detrimental effects on the welfare of society.
The Islamic Market Ideology in Brief.
In line with the ideals of economic justice and the spirit of the 
Law, the Islamic market ideology is oriented towards a conditionally-
free54 enterprise and fair competition; it frowns upon monopolistic 
tendencies and unjustified restrictions on the individual’s freedom 
to own and earn. It allows for acquisition of property, and permits 
“any trade except that which involves injustice, cheating, making 
exorbitant profit,55 and the promotion of something haram 
[prohibited].”56 It places injunctions against actions of economic 
agents oriented towards unjustifiably manipulating market 
conditions to suit their personal interests. It organizes the market 
in a way that promises fair outcomes to participants if allowed 
to function without undue manipulations. And, it places a duty 
upon state authority to act as the moral superintendent of the 
market, guarding against all that contradict the ideals of justice 
and jeopardize public interest, including taking actions to correct 
imbalances that emerge in the market.
It is clear, from the above, that there is no absolute freedom 
within the Islamic market. Freedom is conditioned by the demands 
of morality (upon all important stakeholders), exerted through 
moral inducement, and then through legal coercion (when 
persuasion fails). The individual is free to make economic gains, 
54  There are moral bounds that define the freedom. Where the moral sense of the 
individual fails to induce him into acting morally, the law coerces him to do so.  
55  This will become clearer in the course of the discussion.
56  Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam…, p. 136.
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but, in doing so, is not permitted to violate the economic (and other) 
rights of the other members of society. In fact, it is a principle in 
the application of the law that “any transaction in which one person’s 
gain results in another’s loss is unlawful.”57 Such is in line with the 
principle of fairness; one which looks out, especially, for people 
who find themselves in disadvantaged positions with respect 
to exchange transactions. In the prophetic traditions (hadīth), 
specific acts have been mentioned, which, if perpetrated by private 
market participants, would threaten the fairly competitive market 
environment Islam seeks to create; three of them – najsh, hoarding, 
and forestalling – would suffice for our discussion here. Najsh58 
occurs when a person “offers a bid merely to incite another needy buyer 
into paying a higher price.”59 Hoarding,60 on the other hand, occurs 
when a supplier restricts supply to the market, by hiding what 
should be delivered for sale, in order to make extra gains. According 
to Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406) the outcome of such an act is tantamount to 
“taking people’s property for nothing” since such people paid the 
resultant high prices out of “compulsion” and their “souls continue 
to cling” to whatever they may have spent.61 Finally, forestalling 
refers to the interception of goods before they reach the markets.62 
In addition to the tendency (of forestalling) to restrict supplies to the 
market, the original merchant may be unaware of the prevailing 
market conditions,63 and this disadvantage exposes him to being 
cheated. This, perhaps, is the reason why the Prophet added that 
the merchant has the right to annul any such transaction that takes 
place outside the market if he arrives at the market and finds better 
terms. It is clear that these restrictions are in place to protect the 
fairness of the market and to prevent profiteering out of high prices 
57  Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam..., p. 141.
58  Ibn Umar narrated that: “The Prophet forbade the Najsh.” (Sunan Ibn Majah, 
Vol. 3, Hadith No. 2173)
59  Imam Muhammad bin Yazeed Ibn Majah Al-Qazwini, English Translation of 
Sunan Ibn Majah, Vol. 3, Nasiruddin Al-Khattab, trans., (Maktaba Dar-us-Salam, 2007), 
p. 244.
60  The Prophet is reported to have said: “Whoever hoards is a sinner” [Sahih 
Muslim, Vol. 4, Hadith No. 1605].
61  ‘Abdurrahman ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah…, p.339
62  It is narrated from Abu Hurayrah that the Prophet said: “Do not meet the 
traders on the way, and whoever meets any of them and buys from him, the vendor has the choice 
of annulling the transaction when he comes to the marketplace.” [Sunan Ibn Majah, Vol. 3, 
Hadith No. 2178].
63  Communication was difficult at the time and thus information about market 
conditions could only be obtained by presence in the market; merchants on journey 
could be unaware of changes in market conditions until they arrived at the markets.
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on the needy consumer. This, then, is again consistent with the 
ideals of justice and the objective of protecting public welfare. This 
also brings into question the issue of price and its determination 
within the Islamic market. But, first, the role of government or state 
authority is briefly examined.
The state has a duty to ensure the achievement of public 
welfare through the enforcement of the ideals of justice. It is duty-
bound to act as a moral police over market activities. It must 
thwart all monopolistic and monopsonistic tendencies, prevent 
any form of exploitation, and check all immoral behaviors within 
the market. In a nutshell, it must protect the interest of the public 
by ensuring a natural flow of commodities (especially those that 
constitute necessities) within the market as well as fair outcomes 
in terms of prices and profits. It has the power to punish violators 
of market principles, and, where necessary, directly intervene to 
restore market conditions to normalcy when imbalances emerge. 
The question of what exactly the state authority can do when prices 
are the subject of market imbalance will be answered under the 
discussion on price control in Islamic markets. As a precursor, it is 
important to examine price formation in an Islamic market.
Price and Profiit in The Islamic Market.
Price Formation.
The central position that justice occupies in the Islamic market 
doctrine implies that emergent market prices (and profits that 
accrue to sellers/suppliers) must necessarily be fair to all market 
participants. This idea finds proof in a prophetic tradition reported 
in most of the famous books of hadīth collections.64 It is recorded in 
Sunan Abi Dawood65 that:
The people said: Messenger of Allah, prices have shot up, so fix prices 
for us. Thereupon the Messenger of Allah said: Allah is the one Who 
fixes prices, Who withholds, gives lavishly and provides, and I hope 
that when I meet Allah, none of you will have any claim on me for an 
injustice regarding blood or property.66
In this report we find that Prophet Muhammad did not only 
refuse to interfere with the rising prices, but also declared doing 
64  Musnad Ahmad, Jami’ at-Tirmidhi, Sunan Ibn Majah, etc.
65  This is a collection of prophet traditions compiled by Imam Abu Dawood 
Sulayman ibn al-Ash’ath (d. 889)
66  Sunan Abi Dawood, Vol. IV, Hadith No. 3451.
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so as injustice. This suggests that whatever price that emerges 
from the market, under normal conditions (i.e. conformity with the 
ethic of market behavior), must be harmonious with the ideals of 
justice; they must not unfairly favor either the buyer or the seller, 
and both must willingly agree with it as the correct valuation of 
the commodity in question. For the producer/seller this implies that 
the price is consistent with his/her basic considerations for cost and 
profitability. For the buyer, this implies that the price carries no 
element of exploitation or overvaluation.
In light of the above, and other relevant textual and historical 
information, I categorize price into two levels; the Basic Price (Pb), 
and the Prevailing Price (Pp). The Basic Price is the price that reflects 
the exact per unit cost of producing the commodity in question 
(including the cost incurred in bringing it to the market). It is 
a simple summation of all the elements of cost (per unit) in the 
production process. Its relevance is to serve as a benchmark, for 
both the seller and public authority, in determining the fairness of 
the terms of exchange transactions. This is in line with, and makes 
sense of, the ideals of justice and fairness. Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), in 
The Muqaddimah, gives some historical proof of the role of cost in 
pricing. Firstly, he explains that the cities had higher food prices 
than the desert regions because the cities had custom (and other) 
duties “levied on (foods) in the markets and at the city gates” by 
rulers while such levies were “few or nonexistent among (the 
Bedouins).”67 What he implies is that the suppliers transferred the 
burden of these levies onto consumers (since necessities normally 
have highly inelastic demand curves), thus translating into higher 
food prices. Secondly, and perhaps more conspicuously, he explains 
that foodstuff was more expensive in Spain of his era as opposed to 
the Berber region because,
The Christians pushed the Muslims back to the seacoast and the rugged 
territory there, where (the soil) is poor for the cultivation of grain and little 
suited for (the growth of) vegetables…Thus, (the Muslims) had to treat the 
fields and tracts of land, in order to improve the plants and agriculture there. 
This treatment required expensive labor (products) and materials, such as 
fertilizer and other things that had to be procured. Thus, their agricultural 
activities required considerable expenditures. They calculated these 
expenditures in fixing their prices, and thus Spain has become an especially 
expensive region…The Berber countries are in the contrary. Their fields are 
fine and their soil is good. Therefore, they did not have to procure anything 
67  ‘Abdurrahman ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah…, p. 278.
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(from outside) in order to be able to cultivate agriculture…This is the reason 
for the cheapness of foodstuffs in their country.68
The prevailing price, on the other hand, is the value at which the 
commodity is actually traded in the market at any particular point 
in time. This Prevailing Price, it appears, is what Ibn Taymiyyah 
(d. 1328) refers to as the price of the equivalent (tsaman al-mitsl), 
which, in his words, is “that rate at which people sell their goods and 
which is commonly accepted as equivalent for it and for similar goods 
at that particular time and place.”69 He asserts that the tsaman al-
mitsl of a particular good could change as a result of “deficiency 
in production or decline in import [of the good].”70 Clearly, Ibn 
Taymiyyah (d. 1328) ascribes the determination of the prevailing 
price to market conditions (that is, availability of the commodity 
vis-à-vis its demand) at a particular point in time. In the primary 
texts, we find the prohibition of hoarding, and other practices with 
similar potential effects, as proof of the admission that prices are 
indeed affected by the quantity of the commodity available in the 
market versus the extent of need for it. This is even more explicit in 
the prophetic tradition in which Prophet Muhammad is reported 
to have said: “No one withholds goods till their price rises but a 
sinner”71. Thus, in a nutshell, prevailing market conditions determine 
the Prevailing Price while the cost of production determines the 
Basic Price. The difference between the basic price and the prevailing 
price is the economic gain (profit) that accrues from an exchange 
transaction. But before we discuss this in detail, it is important to 
discuss capital and labor as essential components of the production 
and exchange process.
Factors of Production and their Returns.
Muhammad Baqir As-Sadr (1935-1980) derives a theory of 
production from Islamic jurisprudential sources, aspects of which 
are relevant here. Basically, the theory puts man as the pivot 
of production activity. Man is not placed on the same status as 
68  ‘Abdurrahman ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah..., p. 279.
69  Abdul Azim Islahi, Economic Concepts of Ibn Taymiyyah…, p. 83.
70  Abdul Azim Islahi, Contributions of Muslim Scholars to Economic Thought and 
Analysis (Jeddah: Scientific Publishing Centre, 2005), p. 29.
71  Narrated Ma’mar b. Abi Ma’mar, one of the children of ‘Adi b. Ka’b: The 
Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) as saying: “No one withholds goods till their price rises but a 
sinner”. I said to Sa’id (b. al-Musayyab): “You withhold goods till their price rises”. He said: 
“Ma’mar used to withhold goods till their price rose…” [Sunan Abi Dawood, Vol. IV, Hadith 
No. 3447]
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the various factors he combines to produce. He is an end in the 
production process, not a means.72 Factors of production are 
“servants of man for the accomplishment of the operation of production 
since the operation of the production is for the sake of man and as such the 
share of the producing man differs from the share of the material means on 
the theoretical basis.”73 This is corroborated by the ideals of justice, 
mentioned earlier, that make it a moral duty upon men to accord 
each other the value of humanness, and not treat each other as mere 
tools for private economic gains. As-Sadr highlights two general 
principles in developing his argument. First, if a man produces a 
commodity from a natural base material (resources without any 
specific right to ownership in their natural state) the commodity 
produced is the property of the person whose labor brought it into 
being; “labour-works in nature produce no effect or special right for a 
person until and unless the person himself performs the labour or spends 
directly his efforts in the work of cutting wood or grass or similar labour-
works.”74 The producer still possesses the right of ownership even 
if he was employed to undertake the production by someone else 
(who himself cannot claim ownership of the base material). If other 
tools (belonging to persons other than the producer) were utilized 
in the production process, the producer is obliged to pay the 
owners of the tools a compensation for usage. Such compensations 
are not shares of ownership in the produced article because the 
tools (or their owners) are not entitled to any such shares; they are 
obligations due them for services they rendered. Consequently, any 
such compensation for usage will be meaningless if the tools belong 
to the producer himself. Second, if the base material upon which 
labor is exerted to produce a commodity is owned by the one who 
sanctions the production, then the commodity is the property of 
the owner of the base resource, and not the laborer. Thus, “when an 
individual acquires ownership of a material on the basis of labour and the 
basis continues in existence, it will not be permissible for another person 
to acquire a new ownership to the material even if he were to contribute to 
72  This concept is derived from the Qur’an principle, which makes everything 
on earth subservient to man: “Do you not see that Allah has subjected to you whatever is on 
the earth and the ships which run through the sea by His command? And He restrains the sky 
from falling upon the earth, unless by His permission. Indeed Allah, to the people, is Kind and 
Merciful” [Qur’an 22:65 (Saheeh International Translation, 2010)].
73  Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr, Iqtisaduna - Our Economics, Vol. II Part II, P. E. 
Trust, trans., (Tehran: WOFIS, 1984), p. 12.
74  Ibid., p. 5.
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it a new value by his labour.”75 This principle simply upholds the rule 
of “constancy of ownership”; it is not a conferment upon capital the 
right to share in the commodity thereby produced. In other words, 
the produced commodity is still the base material “in a particular 
state of its transformation” and thus the property of its initial 
owner.76
There is a separation between ownership of the commodity 
produced and its exchange value such that 
the material forces which contribute their share in the act of the production of 
a commodity always receive their reward – on the basis of this separation as 
his (man’s) servants…and not in the produced commodity itself as included 
in the formation of its exchange-value.77
Ibn Khaldūn’s (d. 1406) asserts that “the value of the resulting 
profit and acquired (capital) must (also) include the value of the labor by 
which it was obtained”78 since “gains and profits, in their entirety or for 
the most part, are value realized from human labor.”79 Thus, broadly, 
two forms of compensation for the services of labor are recognized 
– compensation/rent (‘ujrah) and a share in profit/output. In the first 
mode, labor enters into an agreement with the hirer to provide its 
service in return for a specified compensation (wage). The hirer/
producer is obliged to pay the compensation, upon labor’s fulfilment 
of its obligation, irrespective of whether the outcome of exchange is 
a gain or loss. Hence, this arrangement promises security of reward 
for the laborer in the rendering of labor services, though the reward 
may be relatively smaller and limited. The second mode of reward 
for labor is profit-sharing, in which the laborer agrees to take a 
percentage of the emergent profit in return for his/her labor service. 
Thus, the labor provider becomes a risk-sharing partner with the 
owner of the base property in the production. In the event of a loss, 
the base property owner bears it all; the laborer, on his part, gets 
nothing for the labor expended. Thus, while the laborer stands to gain 
relatively higher reward under this arrangement, he/she also stands 
to gain nothing for his/her effort in the event of a loss. Mudārabah is 
an example of this mode, defined as a “profit-sharing commercial 
partnership in which one partner supplies the capital and the other 
75  Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr, Iqtisaduna - Our Economics..., p. 23.
76  Ibid., p. 29.
77  Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
78  ‘Abdurrahman ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah…, p. 313.
79  Ibid., pp. 312-14.
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the time, skill and effort to invest it.”80 Mudārabah, perhaps, was the 
commonest non-agricultural capital-labor production arrangement 
in the entire history of Islamdom. It was the basic arrangement in 
international commercial trade, both in the early years of Islamdom 
(the prophetic era) and in later times (caliphal era). 
Capital (at the enterprise/ firm level) is defined as any resource 
that is utilized by labor to produce a commodity or service;81 
this would include monetary holdings because “they represent 
enterprise’s entitlement to a certain quantity of real goods, existing on 
the market, which will make up its fixed capital and circulating capital.”82 
Thus, we have two categories of capital: physical (or fixed) capital 
– buildings, machinery, necessary tools, etc.; and liquid (monetary) 
capital. It is relevant to mention two important distinctions between 
these two forms of capital. First, physical capital itself goes through 
a production process, through which one thing is transformed 
into another; money holdings can only be used to either purchase 
physical capital, or pay for other services related to the production 
process (such as labor wages). Secondly, physical capital offers 
direct and immediate benefits (assured and measurable) to its user. 
The benefits of money holdings, on the other hand, do not derive 
from some labor embodied in them, for which compensation is 
justified; such benefits derive from the inherent feature of the 
money itself and thus cannot serve as basis for compensation to 
its original possessor. Given these differences, a pre-determined 
rent on borrowed tools utilized in the production process would be 
justified while rent on money would not. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradāwi 
buttresses this point with the assertion that:
When the owner of an article lends it to another person and charges rent 
for the use of it, he is rightfully entitled to this rent in consideration of the 
fact that he prepared the article in question for the renter’s use; as the article 
becomes worn out by usage and depreciates over time, the owner deserves 
compensation…The person who rents a house lives in it, thus receiving a 
direct benefit, while the man who rents a piece of machinery uses it and thus 
derives an immediate benefit.83
80  William J. Donaldson, Sharecropping in the Yemen: A Study in Islamic Theory, 
Custom and Pragmatism, (Boston: Brill, 2000), p. 35. 
81  This definition follows Ibn Khaldun’s analysis of the value of labor in the 
production process, which will be discussed in the next part of this section.
82  Attributed to Fabra (1991) in Shamim Ahmad Siddiqui, “Factors of Production 
and Factor Returns Under Political Economy of Islam,” J.KAU: Islamic Economics, Vol. 8, 
(1996), pp. 3-28.
83  Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam…, pp. 280-81.
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When physical capital belongs to the producer, charging rent 
on it would be meaningless; it forms part of his/her total capital, 
ownership and utilization of which entitles him/her to a profit. The 
proof of this is the mudārabah (partnership) and muzāra’ah (share-
cropping) arrangements which entitle the owner of capital only a 
share in profit based on a preexistent profit/loss sharing agreement. 
In the case of borrowed money holdings, the owner of capital is 
not entitled to rent on cash (interest). Such a rent falls under the 
prohibition of ribā, which according to majority, and most correct, 
opinion, includes all forms interest on capital;84 it “makes no distinction 
between usury and interest, between its simple and compound forms, 
between productive and unproductive loans, or for that matter between 
money and commodity borrowings.”85 Further, “[it] makes no difference 
whether the rate of return is small or big, or a fixed or variable per cent of 
the principal, or an absolute amount to be paid in advance or on maturity, 
or a gift or service to be received as a condition for the loan [or credit].”86 
Commercial capital (cash) differs from physical assets/tools on the 
bases of the distinctions mentioned earlier.  Thus, borrowed money 
holding enters the process as either a partner (mudārabah) or a 
goodly loan (Qarḍ Hasan) – interest-free loan.
The abovementioned modes of compensation for capital and 
labor are based on the principle that acquisition of gain must be 
founded on labor expended in an activity. The laborer is entitled to 
a compensation for the labor he applies directly in the production 
process. The owners of tools utilized in the production process are 
entitled to recompense because their tools embody some previously 
expended labor (that prepared them for use), which become utilized 
in the course of the production. The difference between the two is 
that the laborer of the tools is paid for the utilization of its previously 
expended labor while the laborer in the production is paid for the 
direct utilization of his labor. It follows, as an auxiliary principle, 
that a person is not permitted to make a gain by selling a previously 
acquired material for a higher price unless he improves it through 
some labor expended on it.
 
84  Muhammad Fazl-u-Rahman Ansari, The Qur’anic Foundations and Structure of 
Muslim Society, book III, Vol. II…, p. 73.
85  Zubair Hasan, “Theory of Profit: The Islamic Viewpoint,” Journal of Research 
in Islamic Economics, Vol. 1 No. 1, (1983),  p. 9.
86  Muhammad Umer Chapra, “The Nature of Riba in Islam,” Journal of Islamic 
Economics and Finance, Vol. 2, No. 1, (2006), p. 3.  
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Profit/Surplus.
The difference between the basic price and the prevailing price is 
the profit/surplus to the seller/producer per unit of the commodity. 
The Basic Price is the summation of all rents paid, as well as other 
expenses incurred, in the production of a unit of the commodity. 
Where the provider of labor agrees to a pre-determined wage, 
the wage also forms part of this price. The Prevailing Price derives 
from existing market conditions; it is the actual rate at which the 
commodity is traded in the market. Its change is determined by 
factors that affect the availability of the commodity vis-à-vis its 
demand. This implies that the Prevailing Price could be greater than, 
less than, or equal to the Basic Price. A surplus (profit) emerges when 
the Prevailing Price is higher than the Basic Price, a loss occurs when 
the reverse is true. The higher the difference between the prevailing 
price and the basic price, the larger the per unit profit a tradesman 
makes. If the production/exchange was organized as a form of 
partnership between primary capital and labor, this profit will be 
shared between them on a pre-agreed term. A loss will be borne by 
the owner of capital while the provider of labor earns nothing for 
his/her labor services. 
The Prevailing Price (and profit for that matter) is outside 
the control of any single market agent under normal market 
conditions87. It is the price concordant with the will of God, and 
this equitably serves the interests of the interacting parties within 
the market.88 This is the meaning of Abu Yusuf’s (d. 798) comment 
that “[there] is no definite limit of cheapness and expensiveness 
that can be ascertained” and that “[prices] are subject to command 
and decision of Allah.”89 Tradesmen must not seek to widen the 
gap between the two prices (and make larger profits) through 
immoral means – dishonesty, profiteering, etc. When such acts 
are suspected, state authority has the duty to intervene in order to 
protect the consuming public. The hadith of the Prophet’s refusal 
to fix prices also points to the fact that there is no defined limit for 
market (prevailing) price, and for that matter profit, as long as the 
87  See the hadith referenced in footnote 71. [Sunan Abi Dawood, Vol. IV, Hadith 
No. 3447]. 
88  Muhammad Yassine Essid, “Islamic Economic Thought.” In S. Tood Lowry 
(ed.), Pre-Classical Economic Thought From the Greeks to the Scottish Enlightenment (Kluwer 
Academic Publisher, 1987), pp. 77-102.
89  Abdul Azim Islahi, Contributions of Muslim Scholars to Economic Thought and 
Analysis…, p. 28.
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functioning of the market is not unduly tempered with, and this 
point has been alluded to by a number of scholars.
Price Control (Tas'ir) in Islamic Law.
On the basis of the aforementioned hadith, in which Prophet 
Muhammad refused to fix prices and associated doing so with 
injustice, majority of the scholars of Islamic jurisprudence hold the 
opinion that price control (known as tas’īr in jurisprudential texts) 
is, in principle, not permissible90; that is, market price should not 
be authoritatively imposed upon market participants. However, it 
is also widely held that the Prophet’s response to the request (of 
price imposition) would have been different if there was suspicion 
of artificial inducement of the prices through deliberate immoral 
market behaviors. Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), for instance, suggests 
that the event “was a special case and not a general ruling” and 
that the report did not mention that “someone had refrained from 
selling [i.e. hoarding] or doing something which was obligatory, 
or charged more than the compensation of the equivalent (‘iwad 
al-mithl).”91 Based on this general presumption, majority of the 
scholars also make price control permissible under circumstances 
that violate the fair conditions of the market. 
The Mālikī and Hanafī schools of Islamic jurisprudence consider 
it permissible for the state to intervene when market conditions 
demand for it.92 Imam Abū Hanīfah, for instance, is reported to have 
stated that “[the state] should not interfere except in a condition 
where welfare of the people demands it,”93 while Imam Mālik 
“is reported to have approved of tas’īr only if there are excessive 
price hikes in necessities or if such a rise is seen as imminent.”94 
The followers of Imam Shafi’ī and Imam Ibn Hanbal, on the other 
hand, oppose price control, and insist on a literal interpretation 
of the pivotal prophetic tradition of the Prophet’s refusal to fix 
prices. Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdisī (d. 1223), a Hanbalī jurist, insists 
that “the Prophet did not control prices despite people’s pressure 
on him” and that “the Prophet equated price control with injustice 
90  Ahmad F. Oran, “An Islamic Socio-Economic Public Interest Theory of Market 
Regulation,” Review of Islamic Economics, Vol. 14, No. 1, (2010), p. 134.
91  Abdul Azim Islahi, Economic Concepts of Ibn Taymiyyah…, p. 96.
92  Muhammad Lawal Ahmad Bashar, “Price Control in an Islamic Economy,” 
J.KAU: Islamic Economics, Vol. 9, (1997), p. 33.
93  Ibid., p. 33.
94  Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Tas’ir (Price Control) in Islamic Law…," p. 29.
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(zulm) and injustice is forbidden.”95 This summarizes the position 
of this second group on the issue, though Imam ash-Shafi’ī makes a 
concession for price control when the poor are threatened by hunger 
due to exorbitant prices.96 Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) also recommends 
price control when doing so “facilitates the administration of justice 
among people; i.e. when traders are forced to sell the commodity 
which they are obliged (by law) to sell at the market price, or they are 
being prevented from undue profiteering.”97 This, generally, is also 
the view of his student Imam Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350). 
Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) further suggests that emergency situations, 
such as famine, also call for price control, so that when a person 
possesses “surplus food and people are faced with starvation, he 
will be forced to sell at a just price.”98 Thus, it appears that the norm 
is to allow the market to function without any interference. When 
undue influence is placed on the balance of the market, thereby 
threatening public interest, the state is permitted (and sometimes 
obliged) to intervene in order to bring market conditions back to 
normalcy. How, then, does the state ensure this is done without 
violating the principles of justice?   
Justice in price control implies upholding the fair interests of 
both the public (buyers) and the suppliers. Thus, Ibn al-Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya (d. 1350) implores the authority to not ignore the cost 
and profit considerations of the producer/supplier.99 The producer 
is entitled to earn a fair reward for his/her exertions in a legitimate 
economic endeavor. Thus, some scholars propose a consultative 
approach, whereby “the big traders, buyers and other experts” 
are summoned for price negotiations. Such a method is useful for 
understanding the cost structure of the producers, as well as the 
real plight of the buyers, so that a satisfactory outcome is attained. 
According to Abul Walid Baji (d. 1081), the Mālikī scholar, this 
approach will ensure that “the traders are guaranteed as much profit 
as is necessary for carrying out their business and will not burden 
95  Muhammad Lawal Ahmad Bashar, “Price Control in an Islamic Economy…," 
p. 32. 
96  Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Tas’ir (Price Control) in Islamic Law...,” 
97  Muhammad Lawal Ahmad Bashar, “Price Control in an Islamic Economy…," 
p. 33.
98  Abdul Azim Islahi, Economic Concepts of Ibn Taymiyyah…, p. 98.
99  Shaikh Mohammad Ghazanfar, Abdul Azim Islahi, “Explorations in Medieval 
Arab-Islamic Economic Thought: Some Aspects of Ibn Al-Qayyim’s Economics (AH 691-
751/1292-1350 AD). In Shaikh Mohammad Ghazanfar (Ed.), Medieval Islamic Economic 
Thought: Filling the “Great Gap” in European Economics, pp. 128-141.
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people.”100 This is one of the functions that the determination of the 
Basic Price performs, i.e., serving as a benchmark for determining 
the right price when control becomes necessary.  In the history of 
Islamdom, both opinions on price control have been applied in 
different times, and under different caliphal authorities, though the 
Shafi’ī-Hanbalī opinion has been the more pervasive. 
The function of market supervision, generally, was performed 
through al-Hisbah101. This name was accorded to market supervision 
in the era of the ‘Abbasids (with the officeholder known as “al-
Muhtasib”),102 though the idea, itself, dates back to the era of Prophet 
Muhammad, who is said to have appointed ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab 
and Sa’ad Ibn Al A’as Umayyah to oversee markets in al-Madinah and 
Makkah respectively.103 Further, al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) suggests that 
‘Ali Ibn Abī Tālib “used to roam in the bazar of Kūfa”, presumably 
during his term as the fourth caliph of Islamdom,104 to check the 
pricing activities of merchants and would reprimand culprits for 
their wrongdoings.105 Islamdom, between the assassination of the 
third caliph106 and the enthronement of the ʽAbbāsids, was largely 
plagued with political turmoil. However, sometime after the rise 
of the ‘Abbāsids to the caliphate, Islamdom experienced a period 
of relative peace, which allowed the economy to flourish, with 
international commerce playing an important role. Though some 
market supervision existed before this era of economic prosperity, 
as mentioned earlier, it is recorded that the ‘Abbasids, especially, 
intensified the supervision of the market through the hisbah, and 
supported it with the moral police [Shurtah] in the wake of the 
100 Muhammad Lawal Ahmad Bashar, “Price Control in an Islamic Economy,”…, 
p. 34.
101 Hisbah, in the general sense, is a Qur’anic concept of enjoining good and 
forbidding evil: “And let there be [arising] from you a nation inviting to [all that is] good, 
enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong, and those will be the successful” [Qur’an 
3:104 (Saheeh International Translation, 2010)]. 
102 The officeholder was known as sahib al-sūq prior to the ‘Abbasids.
103 Syed Khalid Rashid, “Peculiarities and Religious Underlining of ADR in 
Islamic Law,” Mediation in Asia Pacific: Constraints and Challenges, (Kuala Lumpur: 
Conference papers of 4th APMF, 2008)
104 Shortly after his enthronement as the fourth caliph of Islamdom, ‘Ali Ibn Abi 
Talib moved administrative activities away from al-Madīna to Kūfa, thus effectively 
making Kūfa the new capital of Islamdom. Central administrative activities never 
returned to Arabia afterwards.
105 Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad at-Tusi Al-Ghazali, Ihya Ulum-Id-
Din (Revival of Religious Learnings), Vol. II, Fazl-ul-Karim, trans., (Karachi: Darul-Ishaat, 
1993), p. 55.
106 ‘Uthmān Ibn Affān was the third caliph, following Abu Bakr (first) and ‘Umar 
Ibn al-Khattab (second).
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growth in commerce and general economic activities.107 Later, when 
the Saljūks ascended the throne of leadership in the 11th century, 
following the erosion of the ‘Abbasids’ authority, Nizām al-Mulk108 
recommended a continuation of the hisbah tradition. He asserted that 
if the office was not strengthened by the rulers, “the poor would be 
in trouble and the people of the bazaar would buy and sell as they 
liked, middlemen…would become dominant, corruption open, and 
the [Sharī’ah] without prestige;”109 the sultans responded positively 
to his recommendation and supported the functioning of the hisbah. 
However, the office became known as ihtisāb in Saljūk-dominated 
territories. The new name continued to be used under the Ottoman 
caliphate, while the muhtasib became known as ihtisāb aghasi (or 
emini).
Generally, the ʽAbbāsid authority is said to have avoided price 
fixation in its market regulatory activities. The muhtasib “saw it as 
a duty to prevent price controls by ensuring that merchants and 
traders avoided arbitrary price changes in essential commodities.”110 
Available record does not also point to any government in historical 
Islamdom as having, on a deliberate and consistent basis, applied 
price fixation in the markets, thus leading to the conclusion, by 
Lewis, et.al. (1986), that the muhtasib “did not normally have power to 
fix them [i.e., prices]”, and would punish merchants “whose prices 
were higher than the accepted rate [i.e. the prevailing price].”111 The 
reason for this could be ideological or, perhaps, simply the absence 
of conditions that necessitated such an intervention. The case of 
Mamlūk-Egypt, however, is an exception. Between the fifteen and 
sixteenth centuries, Egyptian districts experienced high and volatile 
food prices, with intermittent scarcity of bread causing mayhem.112 
However, in spite of the intermittent food shortages, high prices, and 
the general hardships these brought upon the poor, price fixation 
was not one of the measures the state adopted. One of the reasons 
107 Ahmad Farras Oran, Ghaida Khaznehkatbi, “The Economic System Under 
the ‘Abbasid Dynasty.” In Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Islamic 
Economics, Vol. I, (London: Encyclopaedia of Islamic Economics, 2009), pp. 257-266.
108 Abu ‘Ali Hasan ibn ‘Ali ibn Ishaq al-Tusi (1018/9-1092) [Nizām al-Mulk] 
became an influential policy advisor to the Saljūk Sultans when ascended power.
109 Bernard Lewis, et.al, (Eds.), The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. III, (Leiden: Brill, 
1986), p. 490.
110 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Tas’ir (Price Control) in Islamic Law,”…, p. 29.
111 Bernard Lewis, et.al, (Eds.), The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. III…, p. 488.
112 Isa Mahmoud Alazzam, “Factors Influencing the Phenomenon of Rising 
Grain and Foodstuffs Prices in Egypt during the Circassian Mamluks Era (784 AH/1382 
AD – 923 AH/1517 AD),” Asian Culture and History, Vol. 6, No. 1, (2014), pp. 53-63.
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(for the volatile and high food prices) was that the sultan and other 
senior state officials, who, themselves, engaged in the trading of 
grains, used their position of power to create monopoly in the grain 
market. In 1431, for instance, “a decree was issued to buy all the yields 
from all areas of Egypt for the sultan due to its cheap prices, and that for 
the purpose of storing those yields until the prices go up so that they can 
be traded.”113 Such a violation of the Islamic moral code would have 
been difficult to check by the muhtasib even if he/she was willing to 
do so, especially since it originated from members of the political 
elite. Thus, the office of the hisbah was, perhaps, incapacitated to 
deal with such issues in Mamlūk-Egypt. 
The Ottoman era represents a general exception to the history 
of market regulation in Islamdom; a deliberate policy known as 
nerkh was institutionalized to regulate the market, and among 
its functions was the fixing of prices for necessities.  Under this 
system, prices were determined by a committee that included the 
leadership of guilds, experts, and state officers in charge of market 
activities. Pricing took great consideration for cost of production 
and reasonable profit margins for suppliers. Consequently, the 
“[nerkh] prices were flexible vis-à-vis genuine changes in supply 
conditions.” Other aspects of the system ensured a relatively even 
distribution of merchandise by transferring traders to markets in 
need. Also, “[price] discrepancy was allowed over certain markets 
in different locations” to ensure that “flow of goods, especially 
foodstuff, from countryside to the cities did not cease.” Such market 
interventions, according to researchers, were in response to the 
potential challenges that accompanied the structure of the Ottoman 
market.114 As an economy with the features of a traditional society, 
insufficiency in production could easily have resulted in higher 
prices while excessive production could cause prices to plummet; 
this regulatory system was thus “in the interest of both consumer 
and producer.”115 Besides, the agricultural supplies were, generally, 
volatile, while the anticipated increased demand in the month of 
Ramadan resulted in advanced seasonal adjustments.116
113  Isa Mahmoud Alazzam, “Factors Influencing the Phenomenon of Rising 
Grain..., p. 56.
114 Orhan Oguz and Ahmed Tabakoglu, “An Historical Approach to Islamic 
Pricing Policy: A Research on the Ottoman Price System and Its Application”, J.KAU: 
Islamic Economics, Vol. 3, (1991), pp. 63–79.
115 Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the 
Ottoman Empire, Vol. I: 1300-1600, (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 53.
116 Orhan Oguz and Ahmed Tabakoglu, “An Historical Approach to Islamic 
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Conclusion.
This study was an attempt to explain the Islamic market 
doctrine within a functional framework. Islamic Law (Sharī’ah) 
seeks the promotion and advancement of public good, and each 
aspect of the law plays its role in achieving this end. Imperative 
to the achievement of public good is the establishment of justice at 
all levels, and in all aspects, of society. In light of this, the Sharī’ah 
sets up its economic institution in such a way that ensures the 
fulfilment of its role in the advancement of public good. Thus, the 
Islamic economic doctrine is oriented towards establishing a society 
that promotes the overall economic well-being of its members 
by ensuring the right to private property and fair opportunities 
for economic gains, curbing exploitative tendencies of economic 
agents towards one another, and other measures like these that are 
consistent with the value system of Islam. Consequently, the market 
structure is set up, ideally, to provide for the exchange needs of 
society in an equitable manner, to provide fair opportunity for 
private gains through exchange, and to ensure justice and fairness 
in all exchange dealings. Individual interests are important in this, 
but their advancement must not put public welfare in danger.
The Islamic market, thus, upholds freedom of the individual 
to engage in trade and earn fair rewards, and the freedom of the 
market itself to function without undue external influence. Normal 
market conditions, of scarcity and abundance, interact to bring 
about the prevailing price, which in turn determines the profit on 
the exchange of a commodity. Such a price is outside the control 
of any individual market participant, and is seen, philosophically, 
as harmonious with the will of God. The freedom accorded to 
individual members of society, on market participation, however, 
is not absolute; it requires that market behaviors are harmonious 
with Islamic ethics. This implies that individuals must refrain from 
dealing in things that are, in themselves, prohibited for public 
consumption in Islamic Law (such as alcohol, pork, etc.). It also 
implies that individuals refrain from self-centered behaviors that put 
the welfare of society into jeopardy; behaviors that are exploitative 
in nature, and are intended to create advantages for individuals to 
the detriment of the larger society.
The state has a duty to establish a market that fulfils the 
Pricing Policy: A Research on the Ottoman Price System and Its Application,” J.KAU: 
Islamic Economics, Vol. 3, (1991), pp. 63–79. 
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abovementioned ideals. Its duty also extends to overseeing market 
behaviors to ensure conformity with Islamic ethics. This implies 
two things. First, it must neither impede individual freedom nor 
interfere with the normal conditions of the market when there is no 
reason to do so. Second, it must ensure that market participants do 
not unduly interfere with the normal working of the market through 
self-centered behaviors. In the event of such unethical behaviors, the 
public authority must act to restore the market to its goal-fulfilling 
path. On price control as a corrective measure, there are two basic 
juristic opinions. The first (Hanafī-Mālikī) opinion grants the state a 
right to fix prices of commodities in the interests of both the public 
and market suppliers; the second (Shafi’ī-Hanbalī) opinion suggests 
otherwise. Both positions are practically represented in the annals 
of market supervision in historical Islamdom. Where the state 
opts for price fixation, it is required to act in accordance with the 
principle of just valuation; it is required to take the interest of the 
merchant into consideration so as to produce outcomes that are fair 
from the merchant’s perspective. Both the rule and the exception are 
concordant with the Qur’anic injunction: “O you who have believed, do 
not consume one another’s wealth unjustly but only [in lawful] business 
by mutual consent.”117
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